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ABSTRACT
Wireless mesh networks are being used to provide Internet
access in a cost efficient manner. Typically, consumer-level
wireless access points with modified software are used to
route traffic to potentially multiple back-haul points. Mal-
ware infected computers generate malicious traffic, which
uses valuable network resources and puts other systems at
risk. Intrusion detection systems can be used to detect such
activity. Cost constraints and the decentralised nature of
WMNs make performing intrusion detection on mesh de-
vices desirable. However, these devices are typically resource
constrained. This paper describes the results of examining
their ability to perform intrusion detection. Our experimen-
tal study shows that commonly-used deep packet inspection
approaches are unreliable on such hardware. We implement
a set of lightweight anomaly detection mechanisms as part
of an intrusion detection system, called OpenLIDS. We show
that even with the limited hardware resources of a mesh de-
vice, it can detect current malware behaviour in an efficient
way.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.1 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Network Architecture and Design—Wireless
communication
General Terms
Experimentation, Measurement, Performance, Security
Keywords
Wireless mesh network, intrusion detection, performance, re-
source constrained devices
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are self managing net-
works in which radio nodes participate in transmitting traf-
fic from others to reach a destination, which they could not
reach themselves. They are becoming increasingly popular
as a way of providing Internet access in a cost efficient way [9,
18, 26]. In these deployments, clients connect to a mesh
device, which routes their traffic via other wireless mesh
routers in order to reach a mesh node with an Internet up-
link. WMNs will typically use IEEE 802.11 to communicate
between the wireless mesh routers, and a subset of these
routers will have connectivity to the wider Internet.
In many cases, WMNs are operated by the community
that uses them, and the hardware for the mesh devices are
consumer-level wireless access points that run a customised
version of the Linux operating system. These devices are
cost-effective, but are usually constrained in processing and
memory resources. Cost-effectiveness in a community net-
work is crucial, as more expensive hardware could prevent
users from contributing.
By generating malicious traffic, malware infected comput-
ers use valuable network resources and put other systems
at risk. A fundamental tool in defending against malicious
behaviour is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In wired
enterprise settings, an IDS is normally deployed on dedi-
cated hardware at border points of the network. As Inter-
net uplinks in a WMN can be decentralised, selecting a sin-
gle location to deploy IDS functionality may not be possi-
ble. Performing intrusion detection at all Internet uplinks
is undesirable, as users can arbitrarily choose to start shar-
ing their Internet connection to the community, potentially
leaving the network unprotected. Using dedicated detection
systems at multiple locations in the network would be mon-
etarily expensive. All this suggests that a decentralised ap-
proach using the existing hardware, the mesh devices, to
perform intrusion detection is necessary.
In this paper, we address the question of whether it is pos-
sible to use typical WMN hardware for intrusion detection.
To do this, we measured the overhead of performing com-
mon intrusion detection tasks on such a platform. We found
that traffic pre-processing, a necessary step for intrusion de-
tection systems that perform deep packet inspection, can-
not be reliably carried out on a mesh device. Furthermore,
signature-based detection techniques employed in IDSs, such
as Snort, are not suitable because of memory and process-
ing constraints. However, we did find that packet capturing
and connection tracking are sufficiently efficient in most con-
ditions.
In light of these findings, we implemented an intrusion de-
tection system, called OpenLIDS. It uses efficient anomaly-
based detection metrics to identify generic classes of attacks,
including scanning, resource starvation attacks, and unso-
licited email distribution caused by mass-mailing Internet
worms. Furthermore, OpenLIDS collects statistics that can
be used to determine the plausibility and severity of an at-
tack, which can be used to inform the selection of appropri-
ate remedial action, such as blocking or rate-limiting hosts.
We demonstrate the lightweight detection metrics we use are
sufficiently efficient for our target platform. Using collected
traces of the recently discovered Conficker worm, we show
that OpenLIDS is able to successfully detect malicious be-
haviour. We collected traffic from a WMN deployment, and
demonstrated that OpenLIDS did not incorrectly generate
intrusion alerts for benign traffic.
2. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To understand the ability of a typical mesh device to con-
duct operations that are required by an IDS, we initially
determined the base-line overhead of forwarding traffic and
tracking connections. We then measured the cost associ-
ated with packet capturing, traffic pre-processing and pat-
tern matching.
2.1 Experiment Setup
We examine the performance characteristics of a typical
mesh device in a two-hop wireless test network. As an ex-
ample of such a device, we used a Netgear WG302 wire-
less router. It has an Intel XScale IXP422 processor run-
ning at 266MHz, 32MB RAM, 8MB flash memory and
a wireless card with an Atheros 5212 chipset, using IEEE
802.11g. Comparable hardware devices are used in exist-
ing wireless networks [18, 26]. The operating system used
is OpenWRT [19] – a stripped-down Linux distribution for
embedded networking devices that is commonly deployed in
WMNs. The Linux kernel has version 2.6.24.2, and Mad-
wifi [14] drivers are used for the wireless card.
All measurements were performed in a university office
environment. Devices were configured to operate on a chan-
nel which was shared with a wireless network with little
activity. All other available networks were on orthogonal
channels. A two-hop wireless scenario was configured in ad-
hoc mode, where a host sent traffic to the wireless router
which forwarded it to a destination host. Routing tables
were hard-coded.
For all measurements we generated test traffic for 60 sec-
onds. We measured the average CPU usage on the router us-
ing top [22]. Every ten seconds process statistics were writ-
ten to a file. The values were averaged, with the first value
omitted so as to exclude the saturation phase at the begin-
ning of an experiment. All measurements were repeated on
five occasions on different days at different times of the day.
Maximum throughput measurements were subsequently re-
peated three times per occasion. Unless stated otherwise, a
low standard deviation was seen across the results.
2.2 Packet Forwarding
To understand the base-line overhead of forwarding pack-
ets (the fundamental role of a mesh device), we generated a
single TCP stream with thrulay [27] at the maximum possi-
ble sending rate. We use the maximum possible sending rate
to demonstrate a worst-case two-hop scenario. Forwarding
the packets caused an average CPU utilisation of 64.6% on
the mesh device. The average goodput was 13.3Mbps. We
obtained similar values using a Linksys WRT54G3G with
a recent OpenWRT release instead of the Netgear WG302,
or by measuring the CPU usage by analysing the remaining
CPU time with a process with a low priority. If the stream
is directly transmitted between the hosts, without being for-
warded by the router, the average goodput was 25.8Mbps.
The high CPU usage to forward the TCP stream is caused
by hardware and predominantly software interrupt process-
ing. Hardware interrupts are caused by retrieving packets
from the network card. The packets then traverse the IP
stack, which includes the Netfilter system [17]. Such a high
base-line resource usage under high traffic load implies that
an IDS needs to be efficient, otherwise it may not get enough
runtime to process all the packets.
2.3 Connection Tracking
Apart from forwarding packets, another essential task of
the router is to track the state of network connections. This
is essential for Network Address Translation (NAT) and
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI). Connection tracking in the
Linux kernel is performed by the Netfilter system. In Open-
WRT, connection tracking is active by default, and some
WMNs [9, 18] perform NAT on every mesh device.
With three measurements we evaluate the per-packet costs
associated with tracking new and existing connections. First,
we sent SYN packets with random source ports at different
rates. This results in most packets being identified as be-
longing to a new connection. We also sent UDP packets
with an IP length of 40B, equivalent to the combined size
of the IP and TCP headers. All UDP packets use the same
ports and therefore belong to the same connection. To com-
pare against a base-line without connection tracking, we sent
SYN packets and disabled connection tracking with the Net-
filter NOTRACK target. By default, the maximum number
of observed connections is set to 4096 on the WG302. If
the connection table is full, a connection for which no re-
ply packets was observed is replaced, or the new one is not
entered into the table. Figure 1 shows the CPU usage on
the router. The packet rate corresponds to the number of
forwarded packets on the router. All packets were dropped
at the destination.
It can be seen that while forwarding the SYN packets, the
CPU usage increases along with the packet rate until the
CPU resources are exhausted. The high workload in kernel-
space does not allow to forward more than 3705 pps, existing
TCP connections completely stall and user-space processes
get hardly any runtime. The router’s operation is severely
affected. These results suggest, that the router should be
protected against the effect of new connections at high rates
(e.g., with Netfilter limit or hashlimit).
Forwarding the UDP packets requires a hash table lookup
to obtain the corresponding connection, but no new connec-
tion structures need to be initialised and entered into the
connection table. This requires less resources and the maxi-
mum forwarding capacity is limited by the wireless channel.
By comparing the UDP packets to the SYN packets with
connection tracking disabled, we can see that the lookup
alone is costly as well. In all experiments which analyse the
CPU usage for different packet rates, we observed a high
deviation specifically at 800 pps. The cause of this deviation
is a matter for further investigation.
2.4 Packet Capturing
To be able to determine the existence of attacks, an IDS
has to capture network traffic, which involves making pack-
ets accessible in user-space. In this section, we investigate
the overhead associated with different approaches for packet
capturing, including PCAP, PCAP MMAP and ULOG1. We
measure the CPU usage and the ratio of dropped packets,
i.e., packets that are forwarded by the router, but not made
available to the capturing application.
2.4.1 PCAP
A popular way to capture packets is with the high-level
capturing library libpcap [13]. Packets can be filtered in
kernel-space with the BSD Packet Filter (BPF) language
[15]. Using libpcap to capture packets results in capturing
every packet twice: once when it arrives at the router and
once again when it is forwarded. To prevent this, we use
capture filters on the link-layer to only capture incoming
packets. For all experiments with libpcap, we used non-
promiscuous mode, which captures only packets actually be-
ing sent through the mesh device performing the analysis.
To analyse the performance of libpcap, we developed a
test tool that reads packets from the socket and silently dis-
cards them. We used thrulay to generate a TCP stream at
the maximum possible throughput. We also generated UDP
packets with an IP length of 40B. Table 1 shows the CPU
load on the router while capturing the packets. Capturing
packets at their full length is slightly more expensive than
only capturing up to the first 92B of each IP packet. Re-
call the base-line CPU utilisation for forwarding the TCP
stream was 64.6%; capturing packets increases utilisation
further and leaves even less resources for intrusion detection.
No packet drops were observed for the TCP stream. Captur-
ing small UDP packets at high packet rates uses up almost
1We tried to use Netfilter NFLOG [17] and PF RING [7] on






















Figure 1: CPU utilisation to forward SYN packets
with random source ports, with and without Net-
filter connection tracking, and small UDP packets
with fixed ports.
all CPU resources, which results in a packet drop rate of
44.6%.
Method TCP full TCP header UDP
PCAP 80.7% 78.2% 94.7%
PCAP MMAP 80.3% 83.5% 98.4%
ULOG 79.7% 73.6% 83.0%
Table 1: CPU utilisation to capture a TCP stream
and small UDP packets with PCAP, PCAP MMAP
and ULOG.
2.4.2 PCAP MMAP
Libpcap MMAP [37] is similar to the standard libpcap
version but uses a memory-mapped ring buffer instead of a
packet socket to make packets accessible in user-space. It
has been reported to reduce packet drops during high traffic
loads [7].
Performance of capturing full packets of the TCP stream
is similar to the standard version, as shown in Table 1. The
use of the memory-mapped buffer should be faster, as the
packets do not have to be copied to user-space. However,
managing the ring buffer involves performing division oper-
ations, which are expensive. We can see this at the higher
CPU load to capture only packet headers. This is because
the slot length is smaller and on the router, division by a
small number is more expensive than by a large number.
Dividing 20,000 by 4 was 2.5 times slower than dividing by
40. Similar operations would be performed during packet
capturing. No packet drops occurred while capturing the
TCP stream. Capturing small UDP packets fully exhausts
the CPU resources but leads to minimal packet loss (0.1%).
However, because the resources are exhausted by kernel op-
erations (i.e., the divisions), the forwarding capacity is re-
duced. The UDP packet rate with the standard version of
libpcap was 4363 pps, this was reduced to 3778 pps with the
memory-mapped version. Almost all forwarded packets were
captured, but 13.4% less packets were forwarded. The low
drop rate is therefore misleading, as the router is doing less
actual work while leaving fewer resources available for other
applications.
2.4.3 ULOG
The Netfilter system [17] allows the filtering and logging
of packets. With the Netlink ULOG target, packets can be
exported to user-space with the help of the Netlink communi-
cation system. ULOG supports multi-part messages, where
a single read() operation can retrieve up to 50 bundled pack-
ets from the kernel. This reduces the number of necessary
context switches, and should improve performance.
ULOG has the advantage that IP checksums are validated
before packets are handed to the Netfilter system, and the
connection tracking subsystem then performs IP defragmen-
tation before letting packets traverse further [2]. Packets
with an invalid transport layer checksum can be filtered, as
they will have state INVALID. By performing these opera-
tion in the kernel, it is not necessary to implement them in
the IDS in user-space, which should enable performance im-
provement without increasing the risk of detection evasion.
To analyse the performance of ULOG, we implemented
a test program that simply read multi-part messages from
the Netlink ULOG socket, and decoded them to count the
number of packets. Again, the CPU load on the router is
shown in Table 1. Performance is similar to the PCAP ap-
proaches while capturing full packets of the TCP stream.
There is a performance improvement when capturing only
packet headers and performance is significantly better to
capture the small UDP packets. This is because the multi-
part messages are filled slower with smaller capture or packet
lengths than with full packets, resulting in messages being
flushed into user-space less regularly and therefore causing
fewer context switches. Capturing both the TCP stream
and the UDP packets did not result in any packet drops.
2.5 Traffic Pre-processing
Having captured network traffic, an intrusion detection
system, which performs deep packet inspection, typically
performs pre-processing activities to normalise packets be-
fore continuing with the analysis. Example forms of pre-
processing include IP defragmentation, checksum validation,
connection tracking and stream re-assembly. Such manipu-
lations are important to prevent detection evasion. To de-
termine the overhead of pre-processing, we conducted some
experiments using the Snort [24] and Bro [20] intrusion de-
tection systems. Both of them capture packets at their full
length. The standard version of libpcap was used.
Snort is a signature-based intrusion detection system. To
determine the overhead associated with traffic pre-processing
with Snort we used version 2.4.4 and disabled all rules (sig-
natures) – all that remains is packet capturing and pre-
processing activities. On our test network, we generated a
single TCP stream at maximum sending rate with thrulay.
Starting Snort caused 4MB RAM to be used. The test traf-
fic caused 92.7% CPU utilisation and 13.1% of all packets
were dropped. To determine the cost of pre-processing, we
disabled the previously enabled pre-processors flow, frag3,
stream4 and xlink2state, as well as all rules. This resulted
in a CPU usage of 86.5% and the packet drop rate was re-
duced to 7.2%. Performing pre-processing in the context
of a system already close to its resource limit involves costs
that impact the ability to perform detection.
Bro is a real-time network analysis platform that can be
used to perform network intrusion detection by anomaly
detection and pattern matching. Its core is the event en-
gine which performs policy-neutral analysis of network traf-
fic at different semantic levels. It generates high-level events
(e.g., as a connection’s state changes or for HTTP requests
and replies), which can be analysed by user-specified policy
scripts. To generate high-level events, Bro tracks connec-
tions and runs application-layer protocol analysers.
To analyse the performance of Bro, we used version 1.3.2
with no user-specified policy scripts enabled. We set capture
filters to collect all incoming packets. Because no event han-
dlers were specified, Bro skipped the work associated with
creating events. We generated a TCP stream at maximum
throughput, using thrulay. No application-layer protocol
analysis was performed on the traffic, and dynamic protocol
detection was deactivated.
Capturing and processing the generated TCP stream with
Bro fully exhausted the CPU resources, and caused 37.6%
of all packets to be dropped. This demonstrates that packet
capturing and pre-processing under high traffic loads is pro-
hibitively expensive using Bro; running protocol analysers
and processing events (intrusion detection tasks) would fur-
ther increase this cost.
Unlike in our experiments, all packets are not normally
captured using Bro. It comes with default policy scripts,
called Bro-Lite, that, for performance reasons, only cap-
tures and analyses TCP control packets (i.e., SYNs, FINs,
and RSTs), TCP fragments and some services (e.g., HTTP,
FTP control channel, SMTP, and telnet). However, Pax-
son [21] suggests as an increasing number of application pro-
tocols need to be analysed for malicious activity, and on
non-standard ports, then kernel-level packet filtering (as is
done in Bro-Lite) will become less useful.
In Section 2.3, we demonstrated the costs for perform-
ing connection tracking using the Netfilter system. We per-
formed a similar analysis with Bro2 that performs its own
connection tracking, with and without its connection com-
pressor [8] enabled. The aim of the connection compressor
is to improve system performance in situations where high
rates of half-open connections are observed, for example,
during SYN flood or scanning attacks. In such situations,
only a minimal state structure is allocated for half-open
connections. The instantiation of full connection state is de-
ferred until a packet from both endpoints is seen. Memory
requirements for the minimal state are substantially lower
than for the full state. Consequently, large memory blocks
holding several states can be allocated, instead of individual
smaller blocks, and timeout-handling is simplified.
Figure 2(a) shows the CPU usage for Bro to analyse SYN
packets with random source ports and UDP packets with a
size of 40B and fixed ports at different packet rates. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows the packet drop rate. As we have shown
earlier, the connection tracking system of the Linux kernel
gets overloaded by SYN packets with random source ports
at high packet rates. Tracking connections also in user-space
constitutes a second performance overhead which, together
with the packet capturing overhead, causes the CPU re-
sources to get exhausted at low packet rates. It can be seen
that using the connection compressor improves performance.
Both the CPU usage and the packet drop rate increase later
with increasing packet rates. The more efficient memory
management and the postponed allocation of the TCP anal-
ysers pay off. Here only SYN packets are processed. For a
complete handshake, performance with the connection com-
pressor would be worse than without, because both a mini-
mal state and later a full state would have to be allocated.
The connection compressor only improves performance for
unreplied connection attempts and it is only applicable for
TCP and not ICMP or UDP.
Packet drops under high throughput make Bro and Snort’s
stream re-assembly and therefore deep packet inspection un-
reliable. Small packets and especially new connections over-
load Bro already at packet rates far from the maximum
channel capacity. Both systems get overloaded even with-
out actually performing any detection, just by capturing and
performing pre-processing.
2.6 Signature Processing
A widely-used approach to detecting malicious network
behaviour is to match observed network traffic against sig-
natures of known attacks. To determine whether this is vi-
able on lightweight mesh devices, we conducted some exper-
iments using Snort. We used version 2.4.4 of Snort, and the
latest official and freely available set of rules (signatures)
2We did not choose Snort because we will show that Snort’s
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Figure 2: Performance of Bro analysing SYN pack-
ets with random source ports, with and without con-
nection compressing, and small UDP packets with
fixed ports.
that date from 2005. For these experiments, we generated a
single TCP stream, using thrulay.
To determine the cost of signature processing, Snort’s de-
fault configuration was used, and a set of 958 rules out of
3573 was activated (bad-traffic, exploit, scan, dos, ddos, dns,
tftp, icmp, netbios, smtp, virus). Starting Snort with this
limited set of detection rules caused the system to crash
due to memory exhaustion. We had to run Snort with a
slower, but more memory efficient, pattern matching algo-
rithm (configuration option search-method lowmem). With
this setting, Snort used 11MB of RAM.
Snort rules are organised in port groups that are defined
by the protocol, source and destination port. To identify
which rules will have to be evaluated for a packet, a fast
multi-pattern search for the longest content string of each
rule of a packet’s port group is performed on the packet’s
payload. If this initial string matching algorithm finds a
potentially matching rule, the rule’s other mandatory fields
(e.g., source and destination IP addresses) are checked and,
upon success, the optional conditions of that rule validated.
This can include an expensive pattern matching operation
which uses all the keywords of a rule and also validates their
position. This two-phase approach has the advantage that
not all rules need to be fully evaluated. The port group eval-
uated for the thrulay traffic only contained 61 generic IP
rules and rules referring to any TCP source and destination
port. None of them will ever be fully evaluated because the
source and target IP addresses do not match.
In this experiment, Snort exhausted all CPU resources,
which causes 34.6% of all packets to be dropped. Such a
high drop rate makes it likely that an ongoing attack would
not be detected, because the information identifying an at-
tack is in the packets that cannot be analysed. Here, the
number of rules in the port group is small and no rules
matched the incoming packets and therefore no extensive
pattern matching algorithms were run. Pattern matching is
the most expensive task a NIDS must perform [3, 39]. It
is expected that performance would further decrease with a
larger number of rules in the port group (e.g., for port 80)
and with the complete evaluation of signatures.
2.7 Performance Analysis Summary
In this section, we have analysed the ability of a typical
mesh router to perform common intrusion detection tasks.
As a base-line, we have shown that simply forwarding traffic
at high data rates consumes significant quantities of CPU
resources. A part of these resources are used for connection
tracking, i.e., looking up the connection a packet belongs to,
and these costs increase if packets belonging to new connec-
tions are being forwarded.
Packet capturing is one of the fundamental tasks an IDS
must perform. With three different packet capturing ap-
proaches we have shown that capturing increases CPU util-
isation further, but there are sufficient resources to capture
full-length TCP packets at high data rates. Problems exist
with small packets, where only Netfilter ULOG was able to
capture small UDP packets at high rates without drops.
Existing intrusion detection systems Snort and Bro suf-
fered from packet drops when pre-processing a TCP stream
with high throughput, even without performing the actual
intrusion detection. Both systems perform deep packet in-
spection which requires TCP stream re-assembly, connection
tracking, checksum validation and IP defragmentation, to
avoid detection evasion. A high rate of packet drops make
such systems unreliable. We therefore propose to perform in-
trusion detection which does not perform deep packet inspec-
tion. This results in fewer requirements for pre-processing.
Such a system could be more resilient to packet drops or
even allow packet sampling.
We have shown that Snort’s signature-based approach is
unreliable at high packet rates, caused by a high amount of
packet drops. Only a limited set of signatures was active
in our tests, the port group of the test traffic did not con-
tain many rules and no rules were actually evaluated. More
general traffic will have worse performance, as port groups
will contain more rules and some of them will get evaluated
in detail. The space of attacks which could originate from
clients in a WMN is diverse, and to achieve a good cover-
age of attacks a high number of active rules are required.
Further, signature databases grow continuously. This will
increase the memory requirements. For these reasons, we
consider the rule-based approach as not suitable, even at
lower traffic rates.
3. LIGHTWEIGHT IDS
In Section 2, we show how performing intrusion detection
on the platforms that are commonly used in WMNs is chal-
lenging. In particular, deep packet inspection approaches
are not usable reliably, and signature-based intrusion detec-
tion has additional limitations in terms of memory require-
ments. In this section, we describe an anomaly-based IDS,
named OpenLIDS, that can be deployed on the hardware
typically used in WMN settings and that is efficient enough
to keep-up with higher traffic rates. We implement mecha-
nisms that detect generic classes of attack traffic, which were
exhibited in a number of recent malware outbreaks. The set
of detection metrics is extendable, as long as they are effi-
cient enough.
We aim to detect port scanning (e.g., malware propa-
gation behaviour) and resource consumption attacks (e.g.,
TCP SYN flooding attacks), as they have been shown to
have a significant impact on a wireless network’s perfor-
mance, and continue to be observed in current malware [5,
31]. Stone-Gross et al. [32] analysed the effect of such mal-
ware on a single-hop wireless network with a wired back-
haul. In the scenario they analysed, the traffic generated
by a malware-infected computer significantly degraded the
network’s performance.
Additionally, we use simple mechanisms to detect mass-
mailing worms. Wong et al. [36] observed that during sep-
arate outbreaks of the mass-mailing worms MyDoom and
SoBig, the volume of TCP traffic increased by 50%.
3.1 Detection Mechanisms
We use a number of simple host-based anomaly detection
mechanisms to identify malicious behaviour. To determine
the existence of scanning behaviour and resource consump-
tion attacks, we use an algorithm based on that developed
by Wagner et al. [35]. We employ a simple mechanism that
looks at DNS MX queries and SMTP traffic to detect mass-
mailing worms and spam email activity, the latter of which
often originates from compromised computers. IP sender
addresses can be spoofed to obscure the origin of traffic; we
use a simple mechanism to detect this. To have enough de-
tailed information to choose appropriate remedies in case of
an alert, we collect data about the network activity of each
host.
To be able to detect an attack, the detection thresholds
have to be sufficiently low. On the other hand, the thresh-
olds have to be high enough not to cause false alerts for be-
nign traffic. The thresholds presented here are either based
on other work (as for the failed connection attempt analysis)
or on what we define as benign behaviour. They will have
to be adapted to the environment they will be deployed in.
We describe the detection mechanisms in more detail.
3.1.1 Failed Connection Attempt Analysis
Scanning behaviour and certain resource consumption at-
tacks cause abnormal numbers of failed connection attempts.
We elaborate on what we use to determine a failed connec-
tion attempt for TCP and UDP protocols shortly. Wagner
et al. [35] propose a multi-level approach to detecting such
activity that initially performs low-cost traffic analysis on
a per-host basis, and subsequently more detailed and ex-
pensive analysis, if suspicious activity is detected. Figure 3
illustrates the multi-level detection approach. It shows the
states a host that is being monitored can be in for each
protocol (rectangles), the tests performed in order to deter-
mine state-changes and alert generation (diamonds), and the















Figure 3: Failed connection attempt detection algo-
rithm
are based on the original algorithm, which was shown to be
successful at detecting network worms without causing false
positives.
Initially, each monitored host is in state DST NONE. If
more than 50 failed connection attempts are observed for a
host within a minute, it is flagged as behaving suspiciously
and moves into the DST HOST state. Subsequent failed
connection attempts of that host are counted for each desti-
nation IP address individually. When more than 400 failed
connection attempts are counted for a single destination, the
host is confirmed to be carrying out a DoS attack, and an
alert is generated. If connection attempts fail to more than
100 distinct destination addresses, the host is suspected of
scanning and moves into the DST PORT state. If in this
state, connection attempts to a single destination port fail
for more than 100 distinct destination addresses, the host is
considered to be scanning, and an alert is generated. After
five minutes in the same state, a host will return to state
DST NONE.
For TCP, a failed connection attempt is generated when,
in response to an initial SYN packet, an RST packet is gen-
erated with its sequence number set to zero, an intermediate
router or destination sends an ICMP unreachable message,
or a connection times out without any reply. We use a flow-
based definition of a connection for UDP. Most UDP-based
application protocols are bidirectional. Therefore, a UDP
flow without a packet in the reply direction is counted as
a failed connection attempt. Flows of unidirectional UDP-
based application protocols (e.g., RTP [25]) are counted as
failed connection attempts. Because this happens once per
flow, the effect is limited, i.e., we don’t anticipate hosts to
typically generate in excess of 50 such flows in a minute. The
original algorithm presented by Wagner et al. [35] counts
every UDP packet without a reply as failed connection at-
tempt, and would trigger an alert for RTP traffic. Our flow-
based definition of a UDP connection does not have this
drawback, but is unable to distinguish an RTP stream from
a UDP DoS flood with fixed source and destination ports. To
avoid false positives, we are not able to detect such floods.
3.1.2 Spam Detection
Mass-mailing worms like SoBig or MyDoom send emails
directly to a target’s email server [36]. To send emails to a
specific domain, one must first determine the mail exchange
(MX) server for it, which can be achieved using DNS. Be-
cause DNS MX queries are not necessary to send emails via
an ISP’s mail server, observing them can be used to iden-
tify spam sending hosts [16]. Once the target’s MX server
address is known, one or more SMTP connections will typ-
ically be established. To be more robust against false pos-
itives caused by people analysing the MX configuration of
certain domains, the threshold to detect an MX-querying
spam agent not only includes the number of MX queries, but
also the number of SMTP connection attempts. To detect
mass-mailing worms and spam sources, we generate an alert
if during one minute a host sends more than three DNS MX
queries and initiates more than three flows to TCP ports 25
(SMTP).
To send spam email it is not necessary to issue DNS MX
queries; target servers could be hard-coded into the malware
or downloaded. Furthermore, instead of sending emails di-
rectly to the destination server, they could be sent over a
relay, such as the user’s ISP’s mail servers. To cover these
two cases we also count the number of flows to TCP ports
25, 587 or 465 (SMTP, submission and SMTP over SSL). If
a host initiates more than ten such flows per minute, it is
identified as a spammer. Because emails with multiple recip-
ients are normally sent within the same flow, a user is not
expected to send emails at rates higher than this. Potential
email servers within the WMN (an unlikely occurrence) can
be white-listed.
3.1.3 ICMP Analysis
ICMP echo requests are used as a preparation for worm
propagation and to saturate a target’s network links. They
are not essential for a network’s operation and can be blocked
without severe side effects. To keep the detection of mali-
cious ICMP behaviour simple and resource efficient, we anal-
yse the difference between echo requests and echo replies.
If within one minute more than 130 echo requests are not
replied to, an alert is raised. This threshold is high enough
to constantly ping two non-replying destinations with one
ICMP echo request per second each.
In addition to analysing the difference between echo re-
quests and replies, we raise an alert if a host sends more than
62 echo requests that are larger than 256B, more than 3000
ICMP packets or 300KiB of ICMP traffic per minute. Large
echo requests can be used e.g., to analyse Maximum Trans-
mission Unit (MTU) problems, but are not usual. How-
ever, they can be used to starve a target’s network resources.
Analysing general ICMP rates allows us to detect DoS floods
that receive replies and attacks that use other ICMP packet
types.
3.1.4 IP Spoofing Detection
IP source address spoofing is required in certain reflec-
tion attacks [29], and can be used to obscure the source of
an attack. We recommend to filter unreasonable source ad-
dresses, i.e., those not from a network’s own address range.
Furthermore, it is possible to specify network interfaces or
subnetworks on which clients are directly connected to a
mesh device, i.e., without intermediate routers. By doing
this, it allows the observation of a packet’s source MAC
address. If these measures are in place, we can detect IP
spoofing by raising an alert when within five minutes more
than three IP addresses are used by a single MAC address.
This assumes that the MAC address itself is not spoofed.
3.1.5 Annotation
To be able to estimate the severity and plausibility of an
alert and to choose the best suited remedies, we collect gen-
eral data about each host’s network activity and use this
information to annotate detection alerts. We collect the fol-
lowing metrics:
• Number of packets and bytes sent
• Ratio of incoming and outgoing traffic
• Average packet size and standard deviation
• Average flow size and standard deviation
Annotating alerts makes responding to an event easier and
may justify harder responses. An alert about a scanning host
is, for example, more plausible if the average packet and flow
size is low and has a small deviation and it is more severe
(has a higher impact on the network quality) if it has a high
packet rate.
3.2 Implementation Details
OpenLIDS was designed to operate on wireless mesh rou-
ters that run Linux3. It is written in C and uses ULOG to
capture packets. Generally, up to the first 92B of a packet
are captured. This allows us to analyse the TCP source and
destination ports of an inner packet of an ICMP error mes-
sage, if all IP options are used. DNS queries are captured
at full-length.
Because data structures are allocated for each observed
host, it is important to specify the networks that should
be observed. It is likely that no connection attempts from
the Internet are allowed. Observation of WMN clients is
therefore sufficient.
Captured packets and connection events (see Section 3.3)
cause a hash table lookup to obtain a host’s data structure to
increase simple counters. Every 60 seconds these counters
are reset. If a host is in a state other than DST NONE,
failed connection attempts are counted in a hash table. This
has slightly higher resource requirements, but is necessary
to analyse failed connection attempts to single destinations
or ports.
Checking if detection thresholds are reached is performed
periodically every two seconds, rather than on every packet.
We expect this to have better performance. Finally, if an
alert is generated the counters causing this alert are reset
and we stop capturing that traffic which caused the alert.
Optionally, the traffic which was identified as malicious can
be automatically blocked. Both is achieved by modifying
the Netfilter rules and these modifications stay active for a
specifiable amount of time.
3.3 Connection Tracking
We have seen in Section 2 that tracking connections in
kernel-space introduces a performance overhead. Stream
re-assembly in the IDS requires connection tracking to be
performed in user-space as well. Bro gets overloaded with
relatively low rates of new connections. As in OpenLIDS
3OpenLIDS is available for download at http://www.comp.
lancs.ac.uk/openlids/.
we do not re-assemble TCP streams, but need connection
tracking to analyse connection time-outs, we want to take
advantage of the connection tracking system in the kernel.
This already performs the functions we need, and we expect
a performance gain by avoiding having to do the same work
twice.
Access to the connection tracking system in the kernel is
provided over Netlink. It is possible to query the connec-
tion table, modify it or get informed about state changes
by so called connection tracking events (ctevents). We anal-
yse the events on seeing a new connection and on removing
one from the connection table. We use the new events for
generic analysis and the spam detection, and the destroyed
connection events for the failed connection attempt analysis
and to obtain the flow size.
A failed connection attempt is described by a destroyed
connection event, which indicates that no packets have been
received in the reply direction. The destroyed connection
event could be generated by a timeout or the attempt be-
ing rejected with an ICMP unreachable message. To distin-
guish between these two cases, we introduce a new status
flag which is set when related packets are associated with
a connection (e.g., ICMP error messages). To use this flag
a kernel patch is required that allows destination unreach-
able messages to be counted without awaiting a potential
timeout. In the absence of this patch, either the connection
timeout and the ICMP message need to be counted as two
events, even if they are caused by a single failed connection
attempt, or the ICMP unreachable message is ignored and
30 s waited for the connection timeout. The latter approach
cannot be used to detect a UDP flow that aims to starve a
destination’s network capacity and is rejected with multiple
ICMP unreachable messages. Applying the patch in a WMN
should not be a problem, as custom builds of OpenWRT are
used anyway and patches are easy to integrate.
A problem with using the kernel connection tracking sys-
tem is that the timeouts are set not to break open con-
nections. This is important for dynamic NAT and stateful
packet inspection. If a connection is removed from the con-
nection table because of a timeout, packets from that con-
nection which arrive later might be dropped. The default
timeout for TCP connections in state SYN SENT is 120 s,
which would cause long delay in detection. We believe it
to be safe to reduce this timeout to 30 s: retransmissions of
initial SYN packets create a new connection entry, if it was
removed already. The smaller timeout only affects the reply-
ing SYN/ACK packet, which will typically arrive within 30
seconds. The timeout for UDP connections without a packet
in the reply direction is set to 60 s. Reducing the UDP time-
out, e.g., to 30 s could be considered as well, but depending
on the application this modification is more dangerous, so
we do not recommend that. The timeout for ICMP requests
is 30 s, which is acceptably low.
The cessation of connection tracking events after detect-
ing an attack can be achieved if the malicious traffic is au-
tomatically blocked or marked as not to be tracked in the
Netfilter raw table. BPF support for Netlink is under devel-
opment and some features are currently still missing (e.g.,
blocking events based on port numbers). As soon as these
are implemented, connection tracking events can be filtered
in kernel space even without active mitigation or exclusion
of the malicious traffic from SPI.
4. EVALUATION OF OPENLIDS
The performance of OpenLIDS is evaluated using the same
setup as that described in Section 2. To determine whether
OpenLIDS is able to detect malware, we test the imple-
mented scanning detection algorithm with a recent Internet
worm, called Conficker. We also test it for false positives
with real network traces from a deployed community WMN4,
and with two popular peer-to-peer file-sharing applications.
4.1 Wray Community WMN Traces
We have access to a WMN that provides Internet connec-
tivity to members of a rural village, called Wray [9]. The
network consists of twelve mesh boxes that serve up to a to-
tal of 50 users at one time. Internet connectivity is provided
at a single point in the village. The mesh devices in this net-
work use different logical network interfaces for intra-mesh
communication and client access.
To have a set of real-world network traces for our experi-
ments, traffic in the Wray network was captured for 18 days
in Spring, 2008. On every mesh box the first 54B of every
IP packet entering or leaving a client network interface was
captured. To represent traffic at a single point, we merged
all the network traces that we collected. We then split the
merged traces into hour-long segments and all broadcast
messages were removed, leaving only routable traffic. Dur-
ing the busiest hour, a maximum number of 43 hosts were
seen and the average data rate observed was 1.32Mbps.
In experiments using the Wray traffic, the traces were re-
played with tcpreplay [33]. The packets were padded to
their original length and sent to the router. The router had
a default route set to a receiver, which simply dropped ev-
erything. The packet flow contained both ingress and egress
traffic.
4.2 OpenLIDS Performance Analysis
To determine the potential performance benefits associ-
ated with the implementation approach of OpenLIDS, we
conducted similar experiments to those we were performing
in Section 2. We determine how well OpenLIDS performs
to analyse a TCP stream and the Wray traffic sent at high
data rates. We further test the performance to handle small
packets, and new connections at different rates. Finally, we
discuss some of the overheads of using OpenLIDS in terms
of memory usage and impact on packet forwarding.
4.2.1 High Throughput Analysis
For OpenLIDS, analysing a TCP stream generated with
thrulay at the maximum possible sending rate caused a
CPU utilisation of 78.8,% and no packet drops occurred. For
the same experiment, CPU resources were fully exhausted
with Snort and Bro, and they both suffered from packet
drops. In Section 2.4, we described how the performance
overhead to capture packets with ULOG (which OpenLIDS
employs) was comparable to PCAP (which Bro and Snort
uses). Not tracking connections in user-space and not per-
forming stream re-assembly leads to much better perfor-
mance. In contrast to Snort and Bro, which suffered from
packet drops while only doing pre-processing, OpenLIDS is
performing detection in this experiment.
Replaying the Wray trace from the busiest hour at the
maximum possible sending rate, rather than its real speed,
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Figure 4: Performance of OpenLIDS analysing SYN
packets with random source ports and small UDP
packets with fixed ports, compared to the perfor-
mance of Bro.
caused a CPU usage of 78.6%, again without any packet
drops. Only hosts in the WMN were observed (and no hosts
on the Internet), which typically only causes one hash table
lookup per packet. Because the Wray traffic includes more
source addresses and flows than the thrulay traffic, more
host structures were allocated and more connection tracking
events generated. Replaying the traffic faster than its real
speed caused some state changes in the failed connection
algorithm.
4.2.2 Connection Tracking
Similar to the analysis performed in Section 2.3, the per-
formance of OpenLIDS was tested with SYN packets with
random source ports and 40B long UDP packets with fixed
ports. The CPU usage on the router is shown in Figure 4(a)
and drop rates are shown in Figure 4(b). Because Open-
LIDS receives packets and connection tracking events inde-
pendently, we show the packet drop rate as well as the rate
of dropped new connection events. The graphs also contain
the previous results for Bro for comparison.
The UDP packet rate at which the CPU resources get
exhausted is considerably higher than with Bro. Packet
drops start to occur after 3000 pps. This is much higher
than with Bro which already suffers from packet drops at
1800 pps. This improved performance is achieved by not
tracking connections in user-space and by using ULOG for
packet capturing, which performs better for smaller packet
sizes than PCAP.
Each time a SYN packet arrives at OpenLIDS, a new con-
nection event is generated, the packet is captured, and as
soon as the connection table in the kernel starts overflowing,
a destroyed connection event is generated. Because these
three units have to be transmitted to user-space and be pro-
cessed by OpenLIDS, the CPU usage is higher than for Bro
when the connection compressor is in use, but lower than
without it. For new connections, the use of the connection
tracking system of the kernel does not improve performance.
The event drop rate is higher than the packet drop rate,
which is likely to be caused by the use of multi-part messages
for packet capturing. It can be observed that the maximum
achievable SYN packet rate is 2412, whereas it was 3705
without OpenLIDS and the nf_conntrack_netlink kernel
module. In conclusion, generating the connection tracking
events in kernel-space is not as cheap as we expected and
limits the maximum forwarding capacity.
4.2.3 Overhead of using OpenLIDS
At a mere 85KiB, the binary file for OpenLIDS is small,
and uses 836KiB of RAM when it is started. To observe
a single host, data structures of 320B are allocated (272B
if packet and flow deviation calculation is disabled). Ob-
serving 10,000 hosts used 4,128KiB of RAM. This makes
OpenLIDS very suitable to be run on devices with low mem-
ory resources, especially as typically only hosts in the wire-
less mesh network are observed. The memory requirements
are much lower than with the signature-based approach of
Snort.
To determine whether OpenLIDS added any additional de-
lay to traffic or degraded throughput, we compared the data
obtained from measurements with thrulay. We did not ob-
serve a significant difference in RTT or maximum through-
put with OpenLIDS in place. As described in Section 4.2.2,
the maximum forwarding capacity is affected in the presence
of a high rate of new connections. Because we recommend to
limit the rate of new connections in general (see Section 2.3),
we consider this drawback as acceptable.
4.3 Detecting Malware with OpenLIDS
It is not enough to build a resource efficient intrusion de-
tection system; it must also be effective at detecting attacks.
The algorithms we propose for detecting malicious behaviour
are largely based upon existing approaches. Results from
other work [6, 38, 23] suggest, that we will be able to detect
hosts generating spam. The authors of the failed connec-
tion attempt analysis algorithm successfully tested it with
a variety of Internet worms [35]. To demonstrate that our
implementation of this algorithm is effective, we conducted
some experiments using collected traces from the recently
discovered Conficker worm. A key feature of an IDS is that
it does not generate false positives – we used the traces col-
lected from Wray and two peer-to-peer applications to deter-
mine whether our implementation generates false positives.
4.3.1 Detecting the Conficker Worm
We analysed the detection capabilities of OpenLIDS with
the Conficker (a.k.a Downadup) worm. Conficker is a re-
cent network propagating worm, which has spread widely.
It exploits a vulnerability in the Windows RPC service, per-
forms password attacks against network shares, and infects
removable media. To exploit the RPC vulnerability, it scans
random IP addresses on TCP port 445, which makes it de-
tectable by OpenLIDS. The variant we used is detected by
Symantec Norton AntiVirus as Downadup.B and was first
discovered on 30 December, 2008 [5].
To obtain a trace file containing the malicious traffic gen-
erated by Conficker, we infected a virtual machine with the
worm. The virtual machine was connected to an isolated
wired network, and all traffic except outgoing HTTP and
DNS connections was blocked. As a suspected way of evad-
ing detection, Conficker adapts its scanning rate based upon
an estimate of available bandwidth. To simulate networks
with different bandwidth capabilities, we throttled the avail-
able bandwidth on the network uplink router to 96Kbps,
496Kbps or left it unlimited at 100Mbps. For each band-
width setting, the full traffic was recorded.
To test the detection capabilities of OpenLIDS, we re-
played each trace file five times in the same wireless test
environment we used for our earlier experiments. To aver-
age the effect of the periodic counter resets that occur every
minute on OpenLIDS, a random delay between 0 and 59
seconds was introduced between starting it on the wireless
router and starting to replay the trace. The scanning rate
and the average time to detection, after the first scan-packet
was sent, are shown in Table 2. The scanning rate shown
includes a retransmission for every SYN packet.
Bandwidth Scan Rate Detection Time
96Kbps 6.5 pps 121.0 s
496Kbps 17.4 pps 74.0 s
unlimited 67.0 pps 46.5 s
Table 2: Time to detect the Conficker worm with
OpenLIDS with different bandwidth availability.
The results in Table 2 show that at even very low scan-
ning rates, OpenLIDS is able to successfully detect the Con-
ficker activity. Clearly, as the transmission rate increases,
the detection times reduce. Thirty seconds of the delay in
detecting the worm relates to waiting for connection time-
outs. Lower timeout values would increase detection speed.
4.3.2 False Positives
To give an indication of the false positive rate of the de-
tection mechanisms that are deployed on OpenLIDS, we re-
played the fourteen traces from the Wray village WMN that
have the highest data rates at their reals speed. Because the
captured data only includes the first 54B of each IP packet,
we verified that no information required for detection was
truncated (e.g., TCP ports of the original packet in ICMP
unreachable messages). As the captured length is not suffi-
cient to analyse DNS queries, we captured full DNS queries
in Wray for twenty days in early Summer 2008. No MX
queries were seen in these traces.
Replaying the Wray traces did not cause any alerts to
be triggered, but caused some state transitions in the failed
connection detection algorithm described in Section 3.1.1.
The cause of these transitions were peer-to-peer applications.
To improve confidence in OpenLIDS’ ability not to gener-
ate false positives in light of peer-to-peer traffic, we ran ex-
periments with transmission [34], a BitTorrent client, and
aMule [1], an eDonkey and Kademlia client. In both cases
more than 80MB of a single file was downloaded and more
than 270 sources were available. The experiment was carried
out on a 1Mbps DSL line with NAT being applied. Trans-
mission did not cause any state changes. aMule caused a
transition to state DST HOST with subsequent transition
to DST PORT for UDP, and no alerts were generated. If a
particularly aggressive peer-to-peer application used a stan-
dard set of ports, a false alert could be triggered.
4.4 Discussion
We have evaluated OpenLIDS and shown that it is able to
reliably analyse TCP streams and network traffic from a real
WMN at high throughput without any packet drops. Con-
versely, Snort and Bro fully exhausted the CPU resources
and suffered from significant packet drops. Not perform-
ing deep packet inspection avoids having to do stream re-
assembly and therefore to use the connection tracking sys-
tem of the Linux kernel which yields much better perfor-
mance.
For new connections, this approach is not as efficient as ex-
pected, because generating and receiving connection track-
ing events is costly. Performance for new connections is
comparable to Bro. Packets creating new connections are
typically only a fraction of the traffic and efficiency is high
under normal conditions. Using the kernel connection track-
ing system has the disadvantage that time-out values cannot
be adjusted arbitrarily.
Our implementation is able to detect a wide range of at-
tacks with generic and cheap detection metrics. We have
shown it to be successful in detecting a real worm which
scans at relatively low rates. We have further shown that
no false positives were generated when analysing the traf-
fic from a real WMN of the 14 busiest hours in an 18 days
period.
5. RELATEDWORK
We demonstrated that typical wireless mesh devices have
resource issues when performing intrusion detection at high
traffic rates. Similar resource problems exist with intrusion
detection systems that aim to analyse traffic on high-speed
networks. To make intrusion detection scale in this context,
a number of approaches distribute traffic among multiple
detection sensors that operate in parallel [11, 3]. Each sen-
sor analyses only a subset of the packets on the network.
Scalability is achieved by adding more sensors as data rates
increase. Adding detection sensors in a WMN context is
not a desirable option – typically, hardware costs need to be
kept to a minimum.
Another approach to improve performance is by optimis-
ing the rule lookup for signature-based intrusion detection.
WIND [28] implements an adaptive algorithm that system-
atically profiles attack signatures and network traffic to reor-
ganise the rules more efficiently. Their approach uses more
protocol fields to reject rules as soon as possible, and im-
proves the performance of Snort by factor 1.35 to 1.65. Yosh-
ioka et al. [39] use hash tables to find matching rules. Their
approach reduces the memory requirements significantly and
improves performance. These approaches only improve the
rule lookup but not the packet pre-processing, which we have
shown to have performance problems on its own. As sig-
nature evaluation would further decrease performance, and
memory requirements for pattern matching are substantial,
we consider signature-based approaches as not suited for
wireless mesh networks.
Load-based adaptation of IDS behaviour has been pro-
posed as a way of addressing resource constraints. Lee et
al. [12] argue that an IDS should provide the best value
under operational constraints. This means that rather than
missing a critical attack while being overloaded, detection of
less important attacks should be suspended to make the re-
quired resources available. By assigning benefits and costs to
detection metrics, they calculate the optimal set that should
be active under the current resource constraints. Similarly,
to avoid CPU exhaustion and resulting packet drops, Dreger
et al. [8] dynamically control load on a system by modifying
packet capture filters. They statically define an ordered set
of capturing filter as load-levels. The filter of a higher load-
level imposes a greater load on the IDS than its predecessor,
by including more traffic for analysis. The IDS monitors
the current CPU load and switches to a lower load-level if
it reaches an upper threshold, or to a higher load-level if it
reaches a lower threshold.
Reducing packet capturing in the presence of an attack
imposes the risk of missing exactly that attack. A mini-
mal solution is to capture only TCP control packets. This
is sufficient for the failed connection attempt analysis with
TCP, but leads to a loss of useful information (e.g. average
packet size and deviation) and is not applicable to UDP and
ICMP. To reduce the load of the IDS, it is therefore prefer-
able to disable protocol analysers, reduce the amount of pre-
processing activity (e.g. disable stream re-assembly) and
possibly switch to capture only packet headers. In this case
it is possible to perform host-based cheap anomaly detec-
tion, as we presented here. The functionality of OpenLIDS
could therefore build the lowest load-level in such a dynamic
resource-aware intrusion detection architecture. This would
cover resource efficient detection in high load scenarios where
more complex analysis would become unreliable. With more
computational resources available, the detection capabilities
of OpenLIDS can be complemented with additional, possibly
deep-packet inspecting, metrics.
There is some previous research on intrusion detection for
wireless mesh networks. Much of this work addresses either
architectural problems [40, 10, 30] or attacks on the WMN
itself [4], and does not consider issues relating to the limited
resource availability of mesh devices. We believe our work
to be complimentary to this.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an analysis of a typi-
cal wireless mesh networking device performing common in-
trusion detection tasks. It was shown that these resource
constrained devices are unable to reliably perform traffic pre-
processing, which is necessary to perform deep packet inspec-
tion. Furthermore, because of memory and CPU resource
constraints, they cannot effectively be used for signature-
based detection. To address these problems, we implemented
OpenLIDS, a lightweight anomaly-based intrusion detection
system. It has simple host-based metrics to detect scan-
ning behaviour, resource consumption attacks, spam email
distribution and IP address spoofing – common malware be-
haviour. Furthermore, it provides additional information
about the characteristics of a detected attack, which can
help to choose appropriate remedies. The implementation
of the detection metrics is lightweight enough to reliably de-
tect attacks at high data rates. Via experimental results,
OpenLIDS was shown to be able to detect a current mal-
ware variant, and produced no false positives with traffic
traces from a WMN deployment.
As further work, we intend to deploy OpenLIDS in an op-
erational wireless mesh network to further validate our ex-
perimental results. Using the kernel connection tracking sys-
tem has performance advantages under normal conditions,
but is not as efficient for high rates of new connections. Also,
it is not possible to arbitrarily adjust timeout values. Im-
proving the performance of generating connection tracking
events and increasing the flexibility of timeout specification
are issues for further work.
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